




Finding binding constraints in the Pacific
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Hausmann et al. (2004, 2005 and 2006) 
provide an important reminder of the 
implications of the theory of the ‘second 
best’. In the economist’s world of ‘first best’, 
an economic distortion is analysed as if it 
were the only distortion, and its removal 
can be assumed to increase community 
welfare (barring adverse equity effects). 
In the world of the second best, however, 
there are many distortions and the removal 
of one distortion can reduce economic 
welfare because of its interactions with other 
distortions. Hausmann et al. (2005) present 
a second-best portrayal of development, 
including recognition that politicians might 
have limited ‘political capital’ with which to 
implement reform.
It is the policy implications that 
Hausmann et  al .  attached to their 
‘diagnostics’ framework that has attracted 
the most attention. Their key point is the 
importance of targeting economic reform 
on the binding constraints.
Because across-the-board reforms 
are politically difficult and have 
often failed to achieve growth, 
we have offered an approach that 
targets the most binding constraint…
different circumstances send different 
diagnostic signals. An approach to 
development based on these signals 
is likely to be much more effective 
than one based on a long list of 
institutional and governance reforms 
that may or may not be targeted at the 
most binding constraints on growth 
(Hausmann et al. 2006).
Hausmann et al. reject a laundry-list 
approach based on ‘whatever reforms seem 
to be feasible, practical, politically doable, or 
enforceable through conditionality’ (2005:5). 
They argue against the notions that (i) any 
reform is good; (ii) the more areas reformed, 
the better; and (iii) the deeper the reform in 
any area, the better.
This paper seeks to provide a practical 
discussion of how binding constraints on 
economic growth in the Pacific islands 
could be identified as a basis for targeted 
economic reform.
The growth diagnostics approach
Non-economists are justified in their interest 
in the identification of binding constraints. 
Quite reasonably, they look to economists to 
distill a simple statement of what needs to 
be done to raise income levels. Economics 
struggles, however, to provide this simple 
statement. Economic theory highlights the 





quantitative research has been unable to 
tease out the sought after simplification. A 
tension arises between the practical need 
and the economist’s caution.
The problem in identifying a binding 
constraint can be illustrated by a hypothetical 
case. Consider a person who lost their job 
and, because of the fall in income, quickly 
fell into poverty. A lack of employment 
opportunities would be an obvious candidate 
as a binding constraint to an increase in the 
person’s income. Suppose, however, that 
the person lost their job because they were 
repeatedly sick; and they were sick because 
they lived in poor standard housing, where 
the main housing problem was the failure 
of a public water and sanitation system; 
where this failure in turn followed a decline 
in world commodity prices that reduced 
government revenue (for example, from fish 
licence fees, logging or mining).
At what point does an analyst of this 
hypothetical situation assert that there is a 
binding constraint to raising income? Is the 
binding constraint a lack of employment 
opportunities? Or is the binding constraint 
to be found in: low world prices; the 
inability of the economy to find new 
sources of income as world prices drop; the 
failure of the government to reprioritise its 
expenditure and keep water and sanitation 
systems operational; or the incapacity of 
the individual to move quickly to better 
housing? The individual’s lost income 
could have been avoided in a number of 
ways; which aspect presents the binding 
constraint?
Hausmann et al. (2006) approach the 
problem by adopting a ‘decision tree’, 
which is represented to interpret the 
economic ‘signals’ to reform (Figure 1). In 
this framework, which constitutes the core 
Figure 1 The growth diagnostics decision tree
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of their growth diagnostics, the focus is 
on the causes of low private investment in 
physical capital.
In a low-income country, economic 
activity must be constrained by at 
least one of the following two factors: 
either the cost of finance is too high, or 
the private return to investment is too 
low. If the problem is with low private 
returns, that in turn must be due either 
to low economic (social) returns or to 
a large gap between social and private 
returns (what we refer to as low 
private appropriability). The first step 
in the diagnostic analysis is to figure 
out which of these conditions more 
accurately characterises the economy 
in question (Hausmann et al. 2006).
This decision tree is one of many that 
could be developed from Hausmann et al.’s 
theoretical framework. For example, their 
theory recognises that capital encompasses 
not only physical capital, but human, 
managerial and organisational capital 
(Hausmann et al. 2006:8). Hence, they 
reiterate that the accumulation of human 
capital needs to be understood to explain 
the economic growth process. In the above 
decision tree, however, low human capital 
is presented as one of the potential binding 
constraints—that is, it is at the bottom of 
the branches.
The potential for alternative decision 
trees is noted in the subtitle of Figure 1, 
which in Hausmann et al. (2006) is presented 
as ‘[a] decision tree, such as the one below, 
can help identify the biggest obstacle to 
growth.’ To Hausmann et al., the decision tree 
is presented as a way ‘to organise thinking 
about low growth, its causes and cures’ 
(2005:17). It is the potential value of breaking 
down a growth process into linked elements, 
built on a recognition of the challenge posed 
by second best, that appears to warrant the 
most attention, rather than just the single 
decision tree presented.
Growth diagnostics in the Pacific 
so far
Duncan and Nakagawa (2007:2) apply the 
Hausmann et al. (2005) approach to six Pacific 
island nations during the period 1995–2004 
‘in an effort to see what light it may throw on 
the generally poor economic performance of 
the small island states of the Pacific’. They 
conclude that in Cook Islands and Samoa, 
the binding constraints have most recently 
been in the provision of international airline 
services (in Samoa’s case, the problem 
arose from a government monopoly). In 
the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati 
and Vanuatu, pervasive government 
monopolies were identified as the existing 
binding constraints to improved private-
sector development. Political instability per 
se is not identified as a binding constraint, 
but the ‘clientelist’ politics that underlies the 
political instability—and the corruption that 
is often associated with it—is identified as a 
binding constraint in Fiji and Kiribati. This 
constraint was also seen to apply generally 
across the region. Access to secure tenure 
over land for infrastructure and resort and 
hotel development is identified as likely 
to be a binding constraint to development 
of the tourism sector in Vanuatu. Scarcity 
of savings was not identified as a binding 
constraint, except in Cook Islands in the 
period before the economic reforms of the 
mid 1990s.
Like Duncan and Nakagawa (2007), 
Slade (2008) presents a trial application 
of the growth diagnostics approach, in 
this case to Palau. Slade (2008) pointed to 
high regulatory risk in Palau, outdated 
and inefficient microeconomic policies 
and difficulties in obtaining secure land 
access rights as binding constraints. While 
larger investments were able to access 
(largely foreign) capital, smaller business 
opportunities were seen to be constrained 





the difficulty of using land or property as 
collateral.
In contrast, Fallon (2008) identified 
deeper, underlying factors as the binding 
constraints to economic growth in Palau: 1) 
a ‘subsidy mentality’ that affects incentives 
to work and to adopt effective policies; and 
2) conflicts of interest that make it difficult 
to gain acceptance for and to implement 
effective governance arrangements and 
policies for the benefit of the community 
as a whole. Although Fallon (2008) did not 
apply a Hausmann et al. (2005) decision tree, 
his approach shared the same theoretical 
basis.
One of the important observations 
from these assessments is the presence of 
common ground with previous analysis 
of constraints to economic growth. This 
suggests that application of the Hausmann 
et al. approach might yield similar policy 
recommendations to those already familiar 
to the region. This could reflect the quality 
of previous analysis (after all, the growth 
diagnostics is largely a restatement of what 
should be familiar to a policy adviser), the 
lack of the necessary data and background 
economic analysis needed to take full 
advantage of the Hausmann et al. (2005) 
approach, or perhaps the need for extra 
effort to develop the insights of growth 
diagnostics.
A second observation is the importance 
of institutional factors (for example, the 
accountability of politicians) in the poorly 
performing nations.1 This suggests that in 
the Pacific, analysis of binding constraints 
needs to encompass the institutional 
setting. Notably, the assessments to date 
appear to be uncomfortable in factoring 
such issues into their analysis—to append 
the institutional factors once they reach the 
bottom branch of the decision tree.
Underlying and proximate 
determinants of growth
Hausmann et al. (2005:7) focus on the 
proximate determinants of growth: ‘How can 
one apply the results of this rather abstract 
analysis of policy reform and its pitfalls? 
How do we locate the distortion(s) with 
the largest potential impact on economic 
growth? Our strategy is to start with some 
of the proximate determinants of growth.’2 
The term ‘proximate determinants of 
growth’ is not used widely so different 
economists might see it differently; but it can 
be thought of as including the more readily 
apparent and/or quantified determinants 
of growth.
Maddison (1988) offers the following 
formulation based on Mancur Olson’s work 
on the importance of institutions
H →  I S                  Ultimate causality 
 
Y   =   f    F    E        Proximate causality 
D            D     (1)
in which H is significant historical events, 
I is institutions that constitute the social 
order, S is the degree of sociopolitical 
conflict, Y is gross domestic product (GDP), 
D is population, F is factors of production 
augmented by available technology and E 
is efficiency of resource allocation.
Maddison (1988) argues that such a 
framework is too simplistic, and presents an 
alternative, more complex formulation.
H →    I S P  →  T          Ultimate causality 
 
 
Y  = f  NLK   E C ± A     Proximate causality 
D          D     (2)
in which the additional variables are defined 
as P is policies, T is the distance from the 







is the natural resource developed and 
augmented, L is human capital (that is, the 
labour force augmented by investment in 
health, education and training), K is stock of 
all kinds of physical capital augmented by 
technical progress, C is the degree of capital 
usage and A is foreign aid or plunder.
For the purposes of this discussion, a 
key point is that there is a distinction and a 
link between the proximate and underlying 
factors, but causality runs in one direction. 
It appears reasonable to think that a 
binding constraint to growth will manifest 
at the proximate level if there is a binding 
constraint to growth at the underlying level. 
As long as the causality is predominantly 
from underlying to proximate cause, 
however, it is feasible that there can be a 
binding constraint at the proximate level 
but not at the underlying level.
In practice, this could mean that if, 
for example, an institution constitutes a 
constraint on growth, a constraint to growth 
is likely to be evident in the availability of 
capital, factor productivity and so on. The 
true binding constraint would, however, be 
seen most sensibly to be at the institutional 
or underlying level. It is also possible that 
the institutional environment is conducive 
to growth but a market failure is reducing 
investment or factor productivity; in which 
case, the binding constraint would be at the 
proximate level.
Institutions are known to be critical 
to development, with some arguing that 
favourable institutions are an essential 
precursor to economic growth. It is possible 
they are more important in the Pacific than 
elsewhere. In comparison, many Asian 
countries appear to have demonstrated by 
their growth performance that they have 
an institutional environment conducive to 
growth. With a small number of exceptions, 
this is yet to be demonstrated convincingly 
in the independent Pacific island states.3
When are institutions binding 
constraints?
To put into practice the view that institutions 
are potentially a binding constraint to 
economic growth in the Pacific, it is necessary 
to formulate a test of institutional quality. 
The test proposed is whether governments 
are able to identify and implement welfare-
improving policy initiatives—that is, 
Kaldor-Hicks welfare gains. If there is a 
good track record in this regard, it is a useful 
working assumption that the institutional 
environment is sufficiently conducive to 
economic growth for the binding constraint 
to be found elsewhere.
In the Pacific, it is particularly important 
to avoid misinterpreting growth that has 
been led by external factors or resource 
harvesting as satisfaction of the test. An 
economy that is enjoying strong external 
support or resource-led growth is likely to 
see economic expansion on a range of fronts. 
Such growth does not, however, necessarily 
imply an institutional capacity to identify 
and implement welfare-improving policy 
initiatives.
It is also important to avoid a superficial 
examination of the quality of public policy. 
Well and poorly performing governments 
can be expected to adopt similar policy 
platforms in the Pacific. Well-performing 
governments need good policy to raise 
community welfare. Poorly performing 
governments need similar policy statements 
to support claims of legitimacy and good 
intent, while in truth the policy statements 
are a façade. Good policy needs to be 
demonstrated, not just proclaimed.
The author’s preliminary, subjective 
assessment concludes that among the 
independent Pacific island nations, only 
Cook Islands and Samoa could be thought 
of as having an institutional environment 





(Figure 2).4 For these countries, the 
binding constraints to growth are more 
likely to be at the proximate level. 
Other Pacific islands nations send some 
signals that they have the required 
institutional environment. For the other 
independent Pacific island nations, the 
institutional environment is so weak 
that the binding constraints to economic 
growth are very likely to found at the 
underlying level.
This schema provides guidance for 
broad directions for public policy. When the 
binding constraints are at the institutional 
level, the priority for assistance lies in what 
has become known as good governance. 
Drawing on the insight from economics 
that supply cannot create demand, demand-
side initiatives should receive priority in 
the weakest institutional environments 
of the independent Pacific island nations. 
Demand-side initiatives include raising 
education and health standards and access 
to public services and income-earning 
opportunities. These initiatives empower 
people to demand more from government. 
Supply-side initiatives, such as changes to 
the machinery of government and formal 
accountability mechanisms, become more 
important only when the demand for good 
governance is in place. For those economies 
with an institutional environment that is 
conducive to economic growth, the priorities 
are likely to be found in the constraints to 
private-sector development.
A broader decision tree for 
binding constraints?
How can these ideas be tested and developed 
in growth diagnostics? Hausmann et al., 
place corruption and crime and other 
aspects of property rights at the bottom 
of the decision tree, and hence constitute 
one of the exogenous factors that might be 
binding.5 Economists working in the Pacific 
should treat property rights as endogenous 
Figure 2  A potential schema of binding constraints in the Pacific
Are institutions binding constraints? Policy response Pacific island nation
 Yes Demand-side governance Papua New Guinea  
  (for example, education,  Kiribati  
  health, infrastructure) Solomon Islands 
   Timor-Leste 
    Vanuatu 
   Federated States of  
   Micronesia
  Supply-side governance Marshal Islands 
  (for example, public  Tonga 
  financial management,  Tuvalu 
  agency strengthening,  Palau 
  planning) Fiji Islands
 No Private sector development Samoa 
  (for example privatisation,  Cook Islands 
  regulatory reform, infra- 





and hopefully find a way to strengthen them 
through good public policy.
One option to endogenise such factors 
is to develop the branches of the original 
decision tree until institutional factors are 
identified. As Hausmann et al. (2005:10) 
explain: ‘Moving down the branches of the 
decision tree is tantamount to discarding 
candidates for the most binding constraint 
on growth. The over-arching lesson from 
our theoretical analysis is that it is this 
constraint, once identified, that deserves the 
most attention from policy makers.’ 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB 
2008) finds it helpful to move down the 
branches in an analysis of the Philippines—
although this is not made explicit through 
the addition of lower-level branches.
An alternative approach could be to 
formulate a decision tree in which the 
original Hausmann et al. (2006) formulation 
is one branch and institutions is a second. An 
illustrative formulation of an institutional 
branch is presented in Figure 3.
What to do with a binding 
constraint?
Would this mean that all public policy 
initiatives should focus on the binding 
constraints? Hausmann et al. have good 
theoretical support for their view that 
policy reform should be limited to binding 
constraints. Binding constraints are, 
however, difficult to identify categorically, 
and there is enough uncertainty about the 
growth process and the interrelationships 
within an economy to suggest caution in 
adopting too narrow a perspective.
Moreover, there are issues of capacity 
building and sequencing to consider. For 
example, it could take some time to build 
a business environment conducive to the 
private sector. Champions who emerge to 
lead change at the institutional level might 
quickly lose support if binding constraints 
subsequently emerge to private-sector 
development and choke off the realisation 
of benefits from institutional reform. Actions 
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might need to start early across a broad front 
if the economy is to avoid lurching from one 
binding constraint to another.
Layering reforms, while prioritising 
the binding constraints, is an attractive 
approach given these observations.
Conclusion
Growth diagnostics is a potentially useful 
tool for identifying the binding constraints 
to economic growth in the Pacific. It presents 
a well thought out, helpful economic 
framework with an innovative decision-
tree analysis. The decision tree proposed by 
Hausmann et al. (2006) should not, however, 
be seen as necessarily the preferred or 
the only approach. Given data and other 
limitations peculiar to the Pacific, there is 
some risk its application will only restate 
old ideas while adding new terminology 
and complexity to a struggling discussion. 
Depending on how it is applied, it could 
also underplay some of the underlying, 
institutional constraints.
These concerns apply to some Pacific 
island nations more than others. Institutional 
environments are probably sufficiently 
conducive to growth in the Cook Islands 
and Samoa for the binding constraints to 
lie elsewhere. Among the independent 
Pacific island nations, Hausmann et al.’s 
(2006) growth diagnostics decision tree is 
suited most readily to these nations, albeit 
potentially with some tailoring to local 
conditions.
Elsewhere in the Pacific, the binding 
constraints are more likely to be at the 
underlying, institutional level. This is even 
more likely for the other independent 
Pacific island nations. While the growth 
diagnostic decision tree of Hausmann et al. 
(2006) is able to capture institutional factors, 
incorporating the Pacific’s institutional 
dimensions could come at the expense of 
simplicity and openness. Non-economists, 
in particular, might find it hard to follow 
such an approach.
A decision tree oriented to institutional 
analysis might be desirable when binding 
constraints are likely to be at the institutional 
level. Options include a separate institutional 
branch or a move further down the 
decision tree until institutional factors are 
identified.
Notes
1 Economics distinguishes between institutions 
and agencies. Institutions are the formal 
and informal systems that establish the 
‘rules of the game’. They can be thought 
of as the human-devised incentives and 
constraints on market and non-market 
economic transactions. In this terminology, 
government departments are agencies rather 
than institutions (see, for example, Hasan et 
al. 2007 for a recent discussion and Duncan 
and Pollard 2002 for background on the 
literature).
2 These are listed as ‘saving, investment, 
education, productivity, infrastructure, and 
so on’ (Hausmann et al. 2005:7).
3 Duncan and Nakagawa (2007) discuss the 
consequences of the region’s institutions 
for economic growth, drawing on Keefer 
(2004). Crocombe (2001) provides important 
background.
4 This schema shares features with that 
presented by Duncan and Pollard (2002).
5 This is made clearer in Hausmann et al. 
(2004:17), in which a broader formulation of 
the growth model incorporates an exogenous 
variable representing the probability that an 
investor will be able to reap the fruits of his 
investment, and where a high probability is 
attached to microeconomic risks (corruption, 
crime) and macroeconomic risks (current 
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